Healthcare data has been a major goal since the earliest days of cybercrime. Until recently, most cyberattacks in hospitals followed a familiar pattern: ransomware groups would encrypt patient records and ask for payments. The motivation is clear – it’s all about money.
But cybersecurity experts are now warning of the shift. The increasing attacks on health sector systems appear to be driven not by profit but by politics. These incidents are often traced to state-supported groups, aiming to undermine hospital operations, steal sensitive medical data and undermine public trust. The United Nations calls for cyberattacks on health care to “a direct and systemic risk to global public health and security.”
This evolution came during periods of fragility, as trust in health institutions remained fragile. Cyberattacks deepen this mistrust, limit critical infrastructure and blur the lines between criminal enterprises and geopolitical strategies. As someone at the intersection of healthcare security and intelligence sharing, I think it’s no longer just a crime but a threat to national security.
The challenge of attribution
As the motivation behind the cyber attacks in the health sector changes, so does the complexity behind who is behind and why.
Unlike the direct financial motivations of traditional ransomware groups, state-backed movements are often hidden at the level of sophisticated agents, hacking, or loosely affiliated cybercriminals. What could initially be a routine ransomware incident, after a deeper investigation, may reveal signs of a coordinated strategy: targeting critical healthcare infrastructure, maximizing operational disruptions, and carefully avoiding attributed to any nation-state.
In the face of high-profile situations, this pattern has been seen. Several European medical institutions suffered cyberattacks during the 19th pandemic, and officials later allegedly linked to foreign intelligence operations. While these attacks were initially similar to criminal ransomware activities, deeper analysis indicated a broader goal—such as stealing vaccine research, undermining care in public health emergencies, or sowing distrust in health care systems.
This intentional ambiguity provides a good service to the attacker. By covering up strategic disruptiveness as criminal activity, they avoid direct political consequences while still causing serious harm to the institutions that provide patient care. For defenders, this blurred line between crime and geopolitics complicates the response at every level: technology, operations, and diplomacy.
In the health sector, in cyber incidents, patients’ safety is at a direct risk, with little time or ability to conduct in-depth forensic analysis. Without a clear understanding of the nature and purpose of the attack, hospitals and healthcare providers may misjudgment the threat, miss a wider model, and fail to coordinate appropriate defense strategies.
The importance of intelligence sharing
The key to establishing an effective defense is collective action, which depends on the free exchange of information. Key infrastructure organizations come together to form an information sharing and analysis center or ISAC. Health-ISAC brings together more than 14,000 people through the Anon-Profit Industry Association to promote trusted cybersecurity threat intelligence exchanges, resulting in faster and more coordinated responses to emerging risks. Health-ISAC connects hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies and other stakeholders to create an ecosystem where knowledge flows more freely and can amplify early warnings in the global health community.
By sharing indicators of compromise, attack technology, suspicious behavior and lessons learned, organizations can translate isolated observations into industry-wide intelligence. The malware signature found in a hospital today may be an early warning to prevent a global attack tomorrow. In this way, intelligence sharing transforms defense from a series of isolated struggles to a coordinated active effort.
However, establishing and maintaining such cooperation is not without its challenges. Effective sharing depends on trust: Trust will handle sensitive information responsibly and trust the participants to be committed to defending each other. Health department organizations must be willing to report incidents transparently. Cultivating this open culture remains one of the industry’s biggest challenges, but it is also one of its most powerful opportunities to strengthen the industry to prevent increasingly complex threats.
Building elasticity
While strong cybersecurity control is still essential, the reality is that preventing every attack is impossible. Therefore, health sector agencies must invest in resilience: the ability to maintain or quickly recover critical services under attack.
Start with preparation. Organizations should develop and regularly rehearse detailed incident response plans tailored to their specific workflow, facilities and patient care requirements. These exercises help employees know what to do when the system crashes and ensure that confusion or uncertainty during a crisis delays decision making.
Segmented network architecture is another key defense. Through isolation systems, such as separating medical devices from administrative tools or confining lab networks to their own market segments, organizations can prevent malware from moving sideways and causing widespread damage. This separation limits the damage and buys valuable time for the response team.
It is also important to back up and restore the strength and accessibility of the system. Backups should be stored firmly, tested regularly and kept in offline or immutable formats to prevent them from manipulating attacks. Organizations can restore patient records, scheduling tools and communication systems faster, and the sooner they recover safer and more effective care.
The final thought
Sebertak oftenKS shows that resilience is seen as an afterthought. But in the health sector (industry where life is online), it has to be a basic priority. Planning, practice and coordination are no longer optional. They are front-line defenses that can no longer be ignored in cyber warfare hospitals.
What is needed now is a change in mindset. Health industry leaders must view cybersecurity as an IT issue, but a core part of patient safety and institutional trust. This means allocating resources, attracting employees at all levels, and collaborating outside the boundaries of the organization.
No hospital can resist the troops that reshape the threat landscape alone. But through shared intelligence, coordinated responses, and a renewed focus on resilience – the health sector can oppose this rising trend and protect the critical systems of millions of dollars.
