Data reveals how Hezbollah strategically shifts political messaging during the Lebanese crisis

A study using advanced text analysis found a surprising pattern of how Hezbollah communicated with political rivals during the frequent crisis in Lebanon. When Lebanon faces its biggest challenge, powerful political and military organizations have not promoted unity during national emergencies, but have intensified criticism of opponents.

This revelation comes from a comprehensive analysis of the seven-year news report by Japanese researcher Kota Suechika from Hezbollah’s official media Al-Manar. The study, published last month in Journalism and Race Politics, challenges traditional assumptions about political behavior during national emergencies.

“This study methodologically uses quantitative text analysis to contribute to the underdeveloped areas of Arabic political discourse in Middle Eastern studies,” explains Suechika, professor at Ritsumeikan University. “The results of this study suggest that Hezbollah’s political exchanges are shaped by institutional constraints and strategic considerations in Lebanon’s integrated democracy, challenging the essentialist interpretation of Hezbollah’s behavior.”

Strategic Change: When and Why Hezbollah Changes Tone

The study examined 64,000 news articles published between 2017 and 2023, a period marked by the deepening socio-economic and political crisis in Lebanon. Suechika uses sophisticated data analytics techniques to track how Hezbollah’s messaging to rivals fluctuates during a specific event.

Contrary to expectations that a national crisis will promote political unity, Hezbollah’s media reports are particularly negative for rival parties in two major emergencies: the October 2019 anti-government protests (known as the October 17 Revolution) and the disaster of the devastating 2020 Beirut port bombing.

Key findings about Hezbollah’s communication strategy

• Hezbollah’s growing criticism of rivals during the national crisis, trying to divert blame rather than promote cooperation
• In discussing Israel, Al-Manar’s report shows that the tendency to link rival Lebanese parties to negative terms such as “sectarianism” and “split” is stronger.
• Hezbollah adopts a particularly friendly tone to rivals after Iran’s Sudi diplomatic reconciliation in 2023
• When interreligious alliances are crucial
• Message becomes increasingly hostile during cabinet formation after election

The data show that Hezbollah strategically adjusts its political communication to maximize the survival and influence of the organization, rather than sticking to a strict ideological stance. This flexibility challenges a simple explanation of an organization, which is driven only by religious or sectarian motivations.

Beyond cultural essentialism

This study directly challenges what Suechika calls “a static view of Hezbollah’s behavior, characterized by a dual conception of Islamism and sectarianism,” which he argues remains “inherited in the notions of cultural essentialism and classical Orientalism, aiming to explain it through cultural factors such as religion and religion.”

Instead, evidence suggests that pragmatic political actors browse through Lebanon’s complex landscape of sectarian power sharing. The organization’s communication strategy responds to domestic institutional and regional dynamics.

Iran-Sudi Connection

Perhaps most revealing is a sharp change in tone following the Chinese brokerage settlement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023. After this diplomatic breakthrough, Hezbollah’s news about rival parties became more active.

This finding confirms the strong influence of regional politics on internal dynamics in Lebanon, especially the long-standing proxy competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon politics.

At the time, Secretary-General Naslara called the reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia a “positive development, with the possibility of opening up a new horizon throughout the region” and expressed his hope that their deal would have “a positive impact on the Lebanese presidential election.”

This implies a political deadlock in Lebanon? The study shows that the problem may be deeper than any party’s behavior.

“This shows that Lebanon’s socioeconomic and political crisis stems from Hezbollah’s uncompromising political stance, but from the inherent failure of stable democracy itself, which prompted an unfulfilled elite rule in Lebanon’s enduring sectarian religious rule,” Suechika concluded.

As Lebanon continues to drive multiple crises, this study provides valuable insight into how one of its most powerful political actors calculates its messaging. The question remains whether other Lebanese parties follow a similar pattern – Suechika hints at the direction of future research that could reveal a broader dynamic of how Lebanese sectarian political systems operate under pressure.